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Abstract 
In this paper we evaluate the effects of a regional experiment that reduced 
payroll-taxes by 3–6 percentage points for three years in Northern Finland. We 
match each firm in the target region with a similar firm in the control region 
and estimate the effect of the payroll-tax reduction by comparing employment 
and wage changes within the matched pairs before and after the start of the 
experiment. 
According to our results the reduction in the payroll-taxes led to somewhat 
faster wage growth in the target region. The increase in wages offset roughly 
half of the impact of the payroll tax cut on the labour costs. The remaining 
labour cost reduction had no significant effects on employment. 
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A reduction of payroll-taxes lowers wage costs and hence boosts the demand 
for labour. However, the employment effect crucially depends on the incidence 
of the payroll-taxes. If the tax cut leads to higher wages that offset the 
reduction in taxes, the tax cut has no effect on employment. 
Past evidence on the incidence and on the employment effects of payroll-tax 
changes is mixed. Studies that rely on time-series or cross-country variation in 
the national payroll-tax produce widely varying estimates of tax incidence. An 
important problem in such approaches is the omitted variables bias. In the time-
series studies, there may be simultaneous changes in other variables that affect 
wages and employment. In the cross-country studies it is difficult to control for 
all the differences in wage-setting institutions. These unobserved across-
country differences may be correlated with the differences in the level of 
taxation and employment. Therefore, a more promising approach is to examine 
the effects of changes in taxes or other mandatory employer contributions when 
these changes differ across otherwise similar firms. Prime examples of such 
studies include Bohm & Lind (1993) who evaluate employment effects of 
regional wage subsidies in the Northern Sweden, Gruber (1994) who evaluates 
the effects of mandated maternity benefits in the US, Gruber (1997) who 
examines the changes in the mandatory pension contributions in Chile, and 
Johansen & Klette (1998) who examine the effects of regional differences in 
payroll-taxes in Norway. These studies typically find that the changes in the 
payroll-taxes are almost completely shifted into wages with little effect on 
labour costs or employment. 
In this paper we evaluate employment and wage effects of a regional 
experiment in Northern Finland. This experiment abolished employer 
contributions to the National Pension Scheme and to the National Health 
Insurance for firms located in the targeted high unemployment regions. Prior to 
the experiment, these employer contributions varied between 2.95 and 6 
percent of the wage bill, depending on the capital intensity and the size of the 
firm. From January 1
st 2003, all private employers in the 20 target 
municipalities located in the Northern Finland and on the islands along the 
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years. In this paper we focus on the effects in the Northern Finland where over 
90 percent of the eligible firms are located. 
A regionally targeted program has several benefits compared to an across 
the board cut in taxes. Perhaps the main benefit for the policy makers is that the 
effects of a regional program are substantially easier to evaluate. The 
employment change in the target region can be compared to similar regions that 
are not affected by the tax cut. If the target and control regions are truly similar, 
the estimates for the employment effects that are based on the differences in the 
employment and wage changes between the treatment and the comparison 
regions provide much more reliable estimates on the effects of the payroll-tax 
cut than time-series or cross-section variation in the payroll-taxes could ever 
do. 
In this paper we evaluate the effects of the payroll-tax cut using firm-level 
data on employment and wages. Our main results are based on a comparison of 
employment changes in the target region firms to the employment changes in 
the firms located in a control region that is as similar as possible in terms of 
unemployment rate, industry structure and the composition of the labour force. 
We end up comparing the target region firms in the Northern Finland to the 
firms located in other high unemployment areas in the Northern and Eastern 
Finland. 
Comparison of the employment changes across regions still creates 
problems if the regions are not quite similar in all relevant characteristics. For 
example, an industry-specific boom might have different effects in different 
regions depending on the industry structure of the region. To make the 
treatment and the comparison regions more comparable we adopt a matching 
procedure to identify comparable firms (or rather plants) in the treatment and 
control regions. We then evaluate the effects of the payroll-tax cut by 
comparing the firms that are similar in the observed pre-treatment charac-
teristics. 
IFAU – Employment effects of a payroll-tax cut   4 2 The  experiment 
Payroll-taxes in Finland consist of contributions to the Earnings-related 
Pension Scheme, the Unemployment Insurance, the National Pension Insur-
ance, the National Health Insurance, and the Employment Accident Insurance. 
The tax rates of various components vary across sectors and by firm size
1. 
Total average payroll-tax rate was 23.86 % in 2002. (Statistical Yearbook of 
the Social Insurance Institution, Finland) 
In March 2002, the Finnish government agreed to a temporary removal of 
employer contributions to the National Pension Scheme and the National 
Health Insurance for firms that operated in the twenty target municipalities. 
The removal of these contributions lowered the payroll-taxes for the eligible 
firms by 4.1 percentage points, on average. The program was designed as an 
experiment with a stated aim to evaluate the effect of a cut in the payroll-taxes 
on employment. The payroll-tax exemption continued for three years from 
January 1
st 2003 to December 2005. In December 2005, the government 
extended the duration of the experiment to the end of 2009. 
As the payroll-tax exemption may have anticipatory effects, it is useful to 
note that the tax exemption was first suggested by a working group that 
presented its report in December 2001. The law was a part of the government 
budget proposal for the year 2003 that was agreed upon within the government 
in March 2002. The government gave the proposal to the parliament in 
September 2002. The parliament accepted the budget proposal and the 
president signed the law on the payroll-tax exemption in December 2002. The 
payroll-tax exemption was also widely discussed in press during the spring 
                                                      
1 In 2002, the private sector employers contributed 1.69 % of the wage bill to the National Health 
Insurance, and 1.00  % to the Employment Accident insurance. For calculating the National 
Pension Insurance contributions the firms are divided into three categories based on their size 
and capital intensity. The contribution rates in these categories were 1.35, 3.55 and 4.45. The 
Unemployment Insurance contributions are progressive, the contribution rate being 0.7  % of 
wage bill for wages up to 840,940 euros and 2.7 % of the wages exceeding this threshold. The 
earnings-related pension scheme has a relatively complicated fee structure. In the large firms 
pension contributions vary with the age of the employee and are partially experience-rated and 
depend on the number of previous employees receiving early retirement benefits. Small firms 
pay a flat rate of 17.32 %. 
IFAU – Employment effects of a payroll-tax cut  5 2002. It is, therefore, possible that firms who anticipated the tax exemption 
could have altered their employment already before the start of the program in 
January 2003. However, it is unlikely that any employment effects could have 
occurred before March 2002 since the nature of the program was very much an 
open question until then.  
All private employers and state-owned firms that had a “permanent place of 
business” in the twenty target municipalities were eligible for the tax 
exemption. The maximum annual reduction was 30,000 euros per firm. To 
comply with the EU-legislation regulating state-aid that may distort compe-
tition within EU, agriculture, fishing, and transport industries were excluded 
from the experiment. An important restriction was also that municipal 
employers are not eligible for the exemption. 
Prior to the beginning of the experiment the government estimated that 
3,500 firms would be eligible for the exemption, and that the budgetary cost of 
the experiment would be eight million euros. The experiment was financed by 
temporarily raising the National Health Insurance contributions for the 
employers outside the target region by 0.014 percentage points. 
All the target municipalities were located in high unemployment areas. 
However, the geographical borders of the target area were somewhat arbitrary. 
There were other regions outside the target area with comparable, and even 
higher, unemployment rates. The target municipalities were selected through a 
political process and there is no obvious reason why just these municipalities 
were selected. In fact, the original task of the working group that proposed the 
tax exemption was limited to measures that would be targeted only to the three 
northernmost municipalities. In their final report, the working group proposed 
two alternatives: one involving only these three municipalities and another 
involving also nine other municipalities in the Northern Finland. After the 
working group rendered its final report, but before the government gave its 
proposal to the parliament, two more municipalities in Lapland and six 
municipalities on islands along the western coast were added to the tax 
exemption region. On the other hand, the working group would have granted a 
tax exemption also to the municipal employers. The final proposal was a 
compromise that excluded all public sector employers with the exception of 
state-owned enterprises. 
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employers. The employers were only required to file a starting declaration to 
the local tax office. The employers could then simply deduct the tax exempt 
amount from their monthly employer contributions. The additional requirement 
was that the employers also had to report tax exemptions in detail in their 
annual report to the tax administration. The ease of participation was reflected 
in high take-up rates. According to our calculations, all eligible employers with 
at least 50 employees, 90 percent of the eligible employers with at least five 
employees and 75 percent of the firms with 2–4 employees had filed a starting 
declaration by December 2003. 
Most firms that applied for the tax exemption were very small. The median 
firm had only four employees. Only ten percent of the firms had more than 
twenty, and 2.5 percent more than fifty employees. In terms of employment 
and payroll-tax bill these “large” firms naturally represent a much higher share. 
The largest industries were business services, retail trade, hotels and restaurants 
and construction. In total, the experiment involved 2,334 firms with 17,099 
employees during the first year. The reduction of payroll-taxes due to the 
experiment was 4.2 million euros in the first year.  
 
Table 1 Participating firms according to size 
Firm size (number of full- 
time employees) 
N firms  N Employees  Payroll-tax 
deduction 
0 456  31,955 
1 424 424 84,075 
2–4 659 1,836 382,585 
5–9 369 2,451 686,321 
10–19 237 3,202 931,020 
20–49 139 4,153 1,157,750 
50–99 37 1,544 600,498 
101–250 10 1,578 289,497 
> 250  3 911 63,555 
Total 2,334 17,099 4,227,256 
Source: Authors calculations from data provided by the National Board of Taxes 
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We created the matched sample of target and control firms based on the data 
from the Register of Enterprises and Establishments by Statistics Finland. This 
register includes data on sales, wage bill and (imputed) employment of each 
plant in Finland. Each plant can also be located to a certain municipality. There 
were 2,809 firms in the target area and 7,544 firms in the control area. We 
restricted the sample to the private sector firms that had a positive turnover, 
paid at least some wages and employed at least one worker in 2001. We also 
required that the firm has only one plant, so that its location and hence the 
eligibility for the tax exemption can be determined accurately. We found 1,592 
such firms in the target area and 4,265 firms in the control area
2. 
The main disadvantage with the establishment register data is that 
employment numbers are imputed based on the wage bill, composition of 
employment and average wages for various employee groups. It is not clear 
whether the changes in these imputed numbers capture the changes in 
employment, changes in wages, or perhaps changes in the imputation pro-
cedure. Fortunately, comprehensive data on the employment and earnings 
outcomes was available from the Finnish Tax Administration. Data are based 
on employer’s annual notification that all employers are required to submit to 
the regional tax office. The annual notification includes all wages and salaries 
paid during the calendar year. The payments are itemised by employee, and the 
summary form contains the number of recipient itemisations. This number 
equals the number of employees that have received some wages or salaries 
from the firm during the year. Naturally, the number of itemisations is only a 
rough measure of the average employment in the firm. On the other hand, the 
total wage bill (i.e. the product of hours worked and the average hourly wage) 
is accurately reported. 
The tax data therefore provides a reliable estimate on whether the payroll-
tax deduction had an impact of total wage bill. If the total wage bill increased 
                                                      
2 The reduction of the sample size is mainly due to dropping firms that had no paid employees in 
2001. Many of these firms still had positive turnover. As a robustness check we included these 
firms in the sample, but this had no real effect on the results. 
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employment. Reliable estimates on the incidence of payroll-tax changes require 
more detailed information on wages and hours. There is no single database 
where this information could be gathered for all firms. The best available 
sources of data on wages and hours are the wage statistics of the employer 
organisations. In Finland there are two large employer organisations:   
Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers (TT) and Employers 
Federation of the Service Industries (PT)
3. Most large employers are members 
of one of these organisations. Together these organisations cover approxi-
mately 60 percent of private sector employment. 
Both TT and PT wage surveys contain individual data on all workers in all 
their member firms. PT gathers data from October and TT from December of 
each year. Both surveys contain detailed information on monthly or hourly 
wages and regular weekly hours. In addition, there are a number of background 
variables on the employees including sex, tenure, occupation and industry. 
4 Empirical  strategy 
Our estimates are based on differences in employment growth rates between 
the target region firms and a control group. We created the control group by a 
two-stage procedure. We first selected the “counties” (NUTS 4-level sub-
regional units) that were most comparable to the target region in terms of 
unemployment rates, industrial structure and workforce characteristics. We 
based the selection on the regional statistics published in “Seutukunta- ja 
maakuntakatsaus 2002” by Statistics Finland. We excluded from the control 
region other non-target regions in Lapland because they were administrative 
centres with above average education level (Rovaniemi) or major manu-
facturing regions (Kemi-Tornio). Instead, we included areas from Eastern 
Finland just south of the target region (see map in Figure 1).  Our judgement is 
that the choice of comparison areas was rather successful. As shown in Table 2, 
                                                      
3 These two employer organisations merged in 2004. We use data up to 2004 when the wage 
surveys were still conducted separately.  
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rates, reasonably similar industry distribution and a similar population 
structure. In all these dimensions the target and control regions deviate 
substantially from the national average. To minimize the temptation to re-
define the control region ex-post, we fixed the design and published the setup 
before any data on employment effects became available in January 2004. 
(Korkeamäki & Uusitalo 2004) 
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 Table 2 Comparison of target and control regions in 2002 
  Regions in 
Lapland 
 All  Finland 
  Target Comparison   
Population   
Total population  64,979 238,325 5,194,901 
Population density 1)  0.84 4.72 17.06 
Degree of urbanisation 2)  53.28 61.30 83.30 
Percent Swedish  0.18 0.07 5.60 
Percent Pensioners  27.33 28.57 21.87 
Dependency ratio  1.97 1.96 1.30 
Secondary education, % 3)  37.85 37.72 36.10 
University level educ, %  14.85 15.53 23.30 
Employment  
Employment rate, %  52.33 53.18 64.16 
Unemployment rate, %  23.56 21.27 12.34 
Municipal employees, %  22.95 20.56 14.12 
Agriculture and fishing, %  11.74 13.39 4.68 
Manufacturing, %  8.90 15.96 19.38 
Hotels and restaurants, %  6.46 2.90 3.05 
Trade, %  9.35 9.39 12.01 
Municipal finance   
State grants, € / person  1,782 1,498 706 
Tax revenue, € / person  2,085 2,022 2,715 
Notes: 1) inhabitants / km
2, 2) Indicates the proportion of population living in built-up areas 
(%), 3) Persons aged 15 or over who have a degree from a senior secondary school, 
vocational or professional education institution, or from a university. 
 
In addition to having similar population structure and similar industry 
composition, the aggregate economic development in the target and the 
comparison regions has been remarkably similar before the experiment. For 
example, the unemployment rate has been around 20 percent in both regions. 
The unemployment rate in the comparison region has been slightly lower but 
the downward trend in the unemployment rate is very similar to that in the 
target region. (Figure 2).  
IFAU – Employment effects of a payroll-tax cut   12The comparison of unemployment rates in Figure 2 also indicates that the 
experiment did not have a major impact on the unemployment rate. There is no 
clear difference between the target and the comparison regions after the 
beginning of the experiment in January 2003. It would also be interesting to 
compare changes in employment between the regions, but the available data 
sources offer limited possibilities for doing that in a reliable way. Since the 
target regions represent only some 1.3 % of Finnish population, the sample 
sizes in national surveys, such as the Labour Force Survey, become dismally 
small. Eventually, the problem can be solved by computing regional 
employment changes based on register data, but currently only data up to 2003 
are available. 
 













Jan-2000 Jan-2001 Jan-2002 Jan-2003 Jan-2004 Jan-2005
Lapland, target Lapland, comparison
Experiment begins
 
Employment weighted average of the municipality level unemployment rates reported by the 
Ministry of Labour. These unemployment rates are calculated by dividing the number of 
unemployed job seekers in the unemployment register by the number of people in the labour 
force calculated from administrative data in the end of year t–2. 
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control area can be used as a valid counterfactual estimate of what would have 
happened in the target area in the absence of the payroll-tax reduction. Careful 
selection of the comparison region is a necessary pre-condition for the validity 
of this assumption. While focusing on the employment changes “differences 
away” pre-existing differences between the target and control regions, it is still 
possible that the target and the control regions experience different shocks or 
display different pre-existing trends in employment or wages. In particular, a 
different industrial structure may lead to different timing of the business cycle 
in the control and the target regions. 
To further enhance the comparability of the target and the comparison 
regions we matched each firm from the target region with a similar firm or 
firms from the comparison region. We first split the data into seven main 
industries using the industry classification in the Labour Force Survey and then 
applied matching methods to create treatment and comparison croups within 
these industry classes.  
In practice, we estimated logit-models within each industry explaining 
whether the firm was located in the target region. The explanatory variables 
were (log)number of employees, (log)total earnings of the employees, 
(log)total sales of the firm (all measured in 1999, 2000, and 2001) and a set of 
three-digit industry codes. This logit estimation gives each firm the predicted 
probability of being located in the target region, i.e. the propensity score.  
Each target region firm is then matched with its nearest neighbour (or 
neighbours) from the comparison region. We used a genetic matching method 
(Diamond & Sekhon, 2005) that uses both the covariates and the propensity 
score to create matched samples. The genetic matching procedure starts with a 
weighting scheme identical to Mahalanobis distance. The weight matrix is then 
iteratively changed using an evolutionary search algorithm (Sekhon & Mebane, 
1998) until no further improvement in match quality is attained (see Diamond 
& Sekhon for details on match quality criteria). In our case this method yields a 
better match quality with respect to almost all matching variables than simple 
propensity score matching. 
In this evaluation we will follow the effects during the first two years of the 
program. We account for potential anticipatory effects by creating matched 
samples based on data from the end of 2001, before any information on the 
IFAU – Employment effects of a payroll-tax cut   14program was made public. We then compare the treated and control firms for 
both the pre-program period from December 2001 to December 2002 and for 
the program period after January 2003. Our last observation date is December 
2004. The last year of the experiment is left out because of the changes in the 
control area; the firms in ten municipalities in the Kainuu County that belong to 
our control area became eligible for a similar payroll-tax exemption in 2005 as 
a part of a regional self-government experiment. This new experiment may 
contaminate the results of the original experiment but it should not be a major 
issue up to the end of 2004, because adding payroll-tax cut to the Kainuu 
regional self-government experiment was a last-minute change in legislation 
that was announced only in December 2004. 
5 Results 
In the following, we first display evidence that matching balances the charac-
teristics of the firms in the target and the control regions. Then we proceed by 
presenting the results on the employment and wage changes in the target and 
comparison regions. We conclude this section with some further results and 
robustness checks. 
5.1 Covariate  balancing 
Table 3 reports the means of the variables used in matching separately in the 
target and control regions, and in the matched treatment and control groups. In 
the rightmost column, we also report the national averages of the same 
variables. According to the table, the differences between the firms in the target 
and control regions are rather small to begin with and matching removes most 
of the remaining differences. A comparison between the treatment and the 
comparison regions to the national average reveals that both regions differ from 
the national averages and that the treatment region is a substantially closer 
comparison to the treatment region than the whole country. 
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Means,  











Employment 2001, SF  1.06 1.06 1.06 1.12 1.26 
Employment 2000, SF  1.00 1.02 1.03 1.06 1.27 
Employment 1999, SF  0.92 0.94 0.95 0.97 1.25 
Employment 2001, TA  1.66 1.66 1.64 1.75 n.a. 
Employment 2000, TA  1.49 1.52 1.52 1.58 n.a. 
Wage sum 2001, TA  9.65 9.67 9.70 9.74 10.16 
Wage sum 2000, TA  8.62 8.79 8.84 8.71 10.13 
Wage sum 1999, SF  7.57 7.80 7.81 7.59 10.05 
Turnover 2001  11.10 11.21 11.20 10.95 12.16 
Turnover 2000  10.36 10.56 10.54 10.08 12.11 
Turnover 1999  9.50 9.72 9.76 9.23 12.04 
Industry distribution of 
firms (percent of firms)        
Manufacturing   13.69 13.46 13.46 15.80 11.47 
Construction  13.63 13.84 13.84 15.03 13.16 
Trade  20.92 21.11 21.11 21.55 16.62 
Hotels and restaurants  12.44 12.37 12.37 7.67 4.48 
Transport  12.19 12.05 12.05 9.31 10.35 
Business services  13.25 13.46 13.46 14.11 20.71 
Other services  13.88 13.71 13.71 16.53 22.28 
   
N Firms 2001  1,592 1,430 1,430 4,265 136,434 
N Employees 2001, TA  12,318 11,034 10,190 39,111 1,318,654 
Notes: For the ease of comparison, we calculated the control group mean displayed in 
the table using nearest neighbour matching.  
In the table the industry distribution is reported at a one-digit level. In the actual 
matching procedure, we use a more detailed industry classification adding 116 three-
digit industry codes to the logit-models.  
The national averages are calculated from the firm register of Statistics Finland for 
firms with positive employment, wage sum and turnover. SF = Employment figure 
supplied by Statistics Finland, estimated man-years. TA = Employment figure supplied 
by Tax Administration.  
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predictors in the logit-model that is used to explain whether the firm is located 
in the target region. This is also reflected in the distribution of the propensity 
score that is rather similar in the target and comparison regions. This also 
implies that finding regions of common support is not a major problem: a large 
fraction of firms in both regions have estimated propensity scores between 0.1 
and 0.5. 
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As a final check on the comparability between the treatment and the 
matched control groups we examine pre-experiment trends in the key variables. 
Figure 4 presents this comparison for the aggregate wage sum. It appears that 
the firms in the control region were larger in the beginning of the period (1996) 
and have experienced somewhat more rapid growth during the last years of the 
1990s. However, the growth in the matched control firms has been very similar 
to the treatment firms. Note that we use only data from years 1999–2001 for 
matching, so the similarity in the growth rates before this period is not “forced” 
IFAU – Employment effects of a payroll-tax cut  17 into the data, but reflects the similarity between the treatment and the matched 
control firms. Similar analyses on the long-term trends of mean firm size and 
aggregate employment did not detect major differences either. 
 
Figure 4 Development of the aggregate wage bill in the target region firms, 
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Matched target region Matched comparison region
 
Notes: Single plant firms that existed in the end of 2001. Comparison region figures are weighted 
to correspond to the number of firms in the target region at 2001, i. e. weight = number of target 
firms / number of comparison firms. 
 
5.2  Employment and wage sum responses to the regional 
payroll-tax experiment 
Our main response variable is the change in the absolute number of employees 
in a firm. We prefer absolute changes to relative changes because this way 
employment changes add up to the total effect of the experiment and no 
weighting is necessary. However, the qualitative results were similar when we 
measured outcomes using relative employment growth.  
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receive only ancillary income from the firm and concentrate on the employees 
in their principal employment. Even this measure is naturally imperfect 
because it does not capture the variation in working hours.  
Our main findings on employment effects are reported in Table 4. The first 
two columns report the mean growth rates in the treatment and control groups. 
The third column labelled “Treated–Controls” is our estimate for the program 
effect. In each case we first report annual changes. In the lower section of the 
tables, we also calculated two-year changes just before experiment 2000–02 
and after the start of the experiment 2002–04. 
The first observation to note from Table 4 is a strong employment growth 
before 2001 and a strong decrease after 2001 that occurs in both the treatment 
and the control groups. For example, between 2000 and 2001, employment has 
grown by 0.57 persons in an average treatment group firm. Between 2001 and 
employment decreased on average by 0.36 persons in the same firms. This 
pattern is largely due to the entry and exit of firms. Our target population is the 
firms that existed in the end of 2001. The firms that exit before 2001, or enter 
after 2001, are not included in data. On the other hand, exits after 2001 
contribute to the average growth rate with large negative changes, and firms 
that enter before 2001 with large positive changes. 
A more important observation from Table 4 is that employment growth has 
been rather similar in the treatment and the control groups. The differences in 
the growth rates reported in the third column are in most cases smaller than the 
standard error of the estimate, and in no case anywhere close to being 
statistically significant. According to these results the payroll-tax experiment 
has not had a significant effect on employment in the target region. In addition 
to statistical significance it is interesting to assess the economic significance of 
the point estimates. According to Table 4 the two-year change in employment 
after the start of the experiment (2002–04) was on average 0.067 persons larger 
in the treatment group. Given that there are 1,430 firms in the treatment group 
the total employment effect of the tax cut amounts to 96 new jobs or 0.8 
percent growth in employment.   
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  Treated Controls  Treated-Controls Std.  Error 
Change in average number  of employees     
2000–01  0.570 0.537 0.033 0.122
2001–02  -0.356 -0.204 -0.152 0.130
2002–03  0.001 -0.006 0.008 0.147
2003–04  0.198 0.148 0.050 0.164
2000–02  0.221 0.328 -0.107 0.156
2002–04  0.210 0.143 0.067 0.216
Notes: The estimates in tables 4, 5 and 6 are (our favoured) five nearest 
neighbours estimates, estimated using GenMatch procedure as described in 
section 4. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 500 replications. 
 
As noted before, tax data is not ideal for measuring the changes in 
employment. On the other hand, any changes in the wage bill that form the tax 
base should be accurately reported in the tax data. In Table 5 we calculate the 
effect of the payroll-tax cut on the wage bill in the target and control firms. 
Now the estimates have mostly the “right” sign indicating stronger wage bill 
growth in the treatment group after the start of the experiment in 2003. 
Interestingly, the point estimate for the treatment effect is highest in the first 
year of the experiment when wage bill grew on average 1,324 euros more in 
the treated firms. In the second year of the experiment the wage bill growth 
was very similar in the target and the control groups so that the two-year 
change was 1,255 euros (about 2 percent) larger in the treated firms. Also these 
estimates are far from being statistically significant.  
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  Treated Controls  Treated-Controls Std.  Error 
Average change in wage bill, €     
2000–01  5,412 4,714 698 831
2001–02  1,127 1,880 -753 924
2002–03  2,278 955 1,324 1,343
2003–04  1,678 1,747 -69 1,263
2000–02  6,539 6,594 -55 1,298
2002–04  3,956 2,701 1,255 1,994
Notes: The estimates in tables 4, 5 and 6 are (our favoured) five nearest 
neighbours estimates, estimated using GenMatch procedure as described in 
section 4. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 500 replications. 
 
5.3  The effects by firm type 
One could argue that the effect of payroll tax cut might differ across firms. For 
example, firms paying below average wages may be more responsive to wage 
costs if the own price elasticity of low-skill workers is higher than that of high-
skill workers. There could also be different effects in small and large firms. At 
least the effect is likely to be smaller in the firms that paid more than the 
deductible maximum of 30,000 euros in payroll-taxes. For these firms payroll 
tax cut is a lump-sum reduction in taxes and marginal changes in employment 
should not be affected by the tax rate. Finally, the size of the payroll tax cut 
naturally depends on the pre-experiment tax-bracket and one might expect 
larger effects in the firms that face larger payroll tax reductions. 
To examine these issues we split the sample into quartiles defined according 
to firm average wage and calculated the effects separately in each quartile. We 
also calculated the effects of the payroll tax cut separately for the firms that 
paid less than 25,000 euros in payroll taxes in 2001 and that hence were well 
below the maximum tax deduction. Finally, we calculated the effects for the 
firms that were in the lowest payroll tax bracket. (The number of firms in the 
higher brackets was too small for meaningful calculations).   
Table 6 reports the results of these experiments. No clear patterns appear. 
The effect of the payroll tax cut on employment seems to be highest in the 2
nd 
wage quartile. The effect seems also to be higher than full sample average in 
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pay less that 25,000 euros in payroll taxes. The effects on the wage bill change 
appear rather similar though now the largest positive effects appear in the 3
rd 
wage quartile. Due to large standard errors associated with all sub-sample 
estimates not much can be concluded from these numbers.    
 
Table 6 Effect of payroll tax cut by firm type 
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5.4  The effect on wages 
To have a closer look at the incidence of the payroll tax cut we examined its 
effect on hourly wages. As noted before wage data is available only for the 
subset of (large) firms that belong to one of the two employer organisations. 
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2004, for manufacturing (TT) only for 2002–04. 
Since PT and TT wage data come from different surveys and the 
information content is slightly different it is natural to report the estimates 
separately. TT wage data is also divided into the white-collar and the blue-
collar worker files according to whether the employees receive hourly wages or 
monthly salaries. To avoid the need to adjust for different measurement, we 
report also these estimates separately. 
While the firm is a natural unit of observation when measuring changes in 
employment, it is more natural to use individual wages to estimate average 
wage growth. Our wage equation estimates are reported in Table 6. In each 
case we create a measure that accounts for the variation in working hours. In 
PT and TT white-collar worker data we divide monthly salary by usual hours. 
For TT blue-collar data we divide total wages during the last quarter by total 
hours during the same period. We estimate the wage equations using all wage 
components (including various bonuses). We use data for all employees who 
appear in the data in the two consecutive years and use real log wage growth as 
a dependent variable. 
All wage equations include the usual control variables: age, education, 
tenure and gender. We also include an indicator for supervisory or trainee 
status when available, and add a full set of occupational dummies in the wage 
equations. We also report separately estimates where we restrict the sample to 
those occupations that occur both in the target and the control region firms. 
The estimates include year fixed-effects as well as a fixed-effect for being 
located in the target region. The effect of the payroll-tax cut is identified from 
the interaction between year 2003 and target region indicators. The coefficient 
of this interaction can be interpreted as the difference in wage growth rate 
between the employees in the target and control regions due to the start of the 
experiment. 
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Model  ΔW2  ΔW2c  ΔW2  ΔW2c  ΔW2  ΔW2c 
Year 2002  -0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003)  — — — — 




































Target region × 2002  -0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.009)  — — — — 
























        
R2 0.043  0.040 0.089 0.090 0.054 0.038 
N obs.  9,972  8,631 2,493 2,341 7,680 4,312 
N indiv. t-region  746  746 108 108 645 645 
N indiv. c-region  3,134  2,696 1,028 964 2,655 1,306 
N firms t-region  81  81 8 8 10 10 
N firms c-region  255  241 39 39 40 32 
N occupations  178  93 100 85 173 63 
Notes: Model ΔW2 for changes in log hourly wage including overtime, benefits (taxable 
value), and provision payments, model ΔW2c restricted to common support of occupations 
over regions. All equations include gender, age, age squared, years of education, tenure, 
tenure squared, dummy variables for trainees, supervisors, and managers and a dummy for 
each occupation. Standard errors that are robust to clustering within firms are in parentheses 
below the parameter estimates. From manufacturing sector we have excluded one large 
target region firm that shut down during the observation period. 
 
In the service sector, the wage growth seems to have been very similar in 
the target and control regions before the experiment started. In 2003, when the 
payroll taxes were cut, wages grew almost two percent faster in the target 
region. This difference is statistically significant. The difference between the 
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point estimates suggest that wage growth was slightly slower in the target 
region. 
In the manufacturing sector the number of firms is smaller and the results 
are sensitive to whether a large firm that closed down during the period is 
included in the data or not. The estimates are also generally less precise and 
mostly insignificant, but the point estimates are of similar magnitude than in 
the service sector.  
Above, we estimated all wage equations at the individual-level. This may be 
problematic since changes in the large firms have a large weight in the 
estimates. If there are firm-specific shocks, the results may be driven by the 
shocks that occur in some large firms. To reduce the weight of these large firms 
we re-estimated the models giving each firm the same weight. Except for the 
blue-collar workers (where one large firm dominated the results), this re-
weighting had only a minor effect. In particular, the result that the service 
sector wages grew slightly faster in the target region was robust to re-
weighting. 
6 Concluding  comments 
Well designed policy experiments may provide valuable information on the 
effects of taxation on employment for the policy makers. In an ideal case, 
estimates based on regional experiments are more reliable than estimates based 
on cross-country comparisons or time-series data. Estimates from these 
experiments could then be used for cost-benefit analysis and as a basis for 
future tax policy. The main problem in small scale experiments tends to be a 
small number of observations. Measurements of the employment changes of 
firms are noisy and pinning down the effects of reasonably small changes in 
payroll taxes would require a large experiment.  
The Finnish payroll tax experiment reduced payroll taxes by 4.1 percent 
points on average. If the estimates for the sub-sample of firms for which wage 
data is available can be generalized to all firms, about half of the effect of the 
payroll tax reduction on the labour costs was offset by faster wage growth in 
the target region. The remaining two percent reduction in the labour costs did 
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mainly due to small sample size. According to the point estimate the tax cut 
increased employment by 0.8 percent indicating that labour demand elasticity 
would be around 0.4, well within the range of earlier estimates. Unfortunately, 
the confidence bands around this estimate are too wide to give much guidance 
to future tax policy.  
Targeting the cut in the payroll-taxes to narrowly defined regions, and the 
temporary nature of the tax cut, naturally limits the extent to which the results 
can be generalised to the potential effects of permanently reducing payroll-
taxes in the whole country. First, the payroll-tax experiment was financed by 
increasing payroll-taxes in the rest of the country. In a national scheme, the 
budgetary cost would need to be financed by raising other taxes. Second, a 
regional experiment may have substitution effects if the firms reallocate labour 
to the target region from the rest of the country. This might be beneficial in the 
sense that a partial motivation behind the regional payroll-tax cut was to boost 
employment in the disadvantaged regions. However, this limits the usefulness 
of the results from the experiment in predicting the effects from a national 
program. Third, also the incidence of the tax cut may be different in a regional 
program since the wage increases are largely determined in national bargaining 
between unions and employer organisations. Any nation-wide changes in the 
payroll-taxes may have an impact on the outcome of these negotiations while a 
regional program that affects only a small share of employers has little weight 
in the national bargaining. Finally, a temporary program is likely to create 
smaller employment effects than a permanent reduction of the payroll-taxes. 
Three years may not be a sufficiently long period for the firms to adjust their 
demand for labour to a relatively small change in the labour costs.  
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Changes in the Formation of the firm sample 
Appendix Table 1 From all firm register records to single plant firms with 
  positive employment, wage sum and turnover 
  Target region    Comparison region 
Eligible industry, number of 
firms in SF 2001 firm table  2809      7543   
 Median  Mean  Sum    Median  Mean  Sum 
Employment, TA  1  5.74 16 121 1 7.36 55 480 
Employment, SF  1  2.62 7363 1 3.70 27 904 
Wage sum, TA  2,876  49,243 138.3 M 3,221 75,681 570.9 M 
Turnover  58,200  382,674 1,074.9 M 57,964 484,936 3,658.4 M 
          
AND number of plants = 1  2,732      7,258   
Employment, TA  1  4.51 12,318 1 5.39 39 111 
Employment, SF  1  2.00 5,469 1 2.52 18 460 
Wage sum, TA  2,364  34,144 93.2 M 2,321 48,476 351.8 M 
Turnover  56,060  274,077 748.8 M 55,504 294,800 2,140.0 M 
          
AND turnover > 0  2,692      7,200   
Employment, TA  1  4.58 12,318 1 5.44 39 132 
Employment, SF  1  2.03 5,465 1 2.56 18 444 
Wage sum, TA  2,645  34,652 93.3 M 2,455 48,867 351.8 M 
Turnover  57,348  278,150 748.8 M 56,229 297,211 2,140.2 M 
          
AND TA wage sum > 0 & 
TA employment > 0   1,592      4265   
Employment, TA  3  7.74 12,318 4 9.17 39 132 
Employment, SF  1  3.62  845 2 3.89 16 605 
Wage sum, TA  18,486  58,252 92.7 M 21,550 81,380 347.3 M 
Turnover  112,368  433,103 689.5 M 111,959 455,200 1,942.3 M 
          
Notes: SF = Statistics Finland supplied man-year estimates, TA = Tax Administration supplied 
numbers on the total number of employees on payroll over a one year period. 
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with different matching methods 
Appendix Table 2 Covariate balancing with different matching methods 
 
Bias before 
matching  Bias after matching (reduction, %) 
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Notes: The standardised bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-
treated (full or matched) sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the 
sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups (formulae from Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1985). 
SF = Employment figure supplied by Statistics Finland, estimated man-years. 
TA = Employment figure supplied by Tax Administration, # of employees on payroll over a 
year. 
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